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Abstract
With the growing emphasis on users’ privacy, federated learning has becomemore
and more popular. Many architectures have been raised for a better security. Most
architecture work on the assumption that data’s gradient could not leak informa-
tion. However, somework, recently, has shown such gradients may lead to leakage
of the training data. In this paper, we discuss the leakage based on a federated ap-
proximated logistic regression model and show that such gradient’s leakage could
leak the complete training data if all elements of the inputs are either 0 or 1.
1 Introduction
Federated learning, where multiple parties construct a joint model with each party’s own data, has
become more and more popular with the increase of the emphasis on privacy. Many architectures
have been proposed (e.g.McMahan et al. [2016] and Konecˇny` et al. [2016]) for a tradeoff between
effeciency and security. However some work have analyzed the leakage in federated learning (e.g.
Hitaj et al. [2017]). Hence many defense work have been proposed (e.g. Bonawitz et al. [2017]
and Geyer et al. [2017]). One of the defenses is to use additive homomorphic encryption to encrypt
model parameters for secure aggregation during the update procedure (Aono et al. [2017]).
However this technique might not mitigate the leakage in federated learning. Melis et al. [2018]
has shown an honest-but-curious participant could obtain the gradient computed by others through
the difference of the global joint model and thus can infer unintended feature of the training data.
Zhu et al. [2019] ‘steal’s the training data pixel-wise from gradients. But these methods can only
work on complicated networks (e.g. Convolutional Neural Network) due to its huge parameters and
do not apply to simple models like the logistic regression model.
For logistic regression model, the loss function cannot be directly encrypted by additive homomor-
phic encryption due to the imcompatiablity of sigmoid function and additive homomorphic encryp-
tion. Thus many approximation work (e.g. Aono et al. [2016]) are proposed, of which the goals
are to increase accuracy as well as approxiamate the sigmoid function for additive homomorphic
encryption.
In this paper, we discuss the leakage of the federated approximated logistic regression model in
the case where all elements of the input are binary, which is a widely used encoding method in
gene data analysis (e.g. Uhlerop et al. [2013]) and risk analysis. The loss function of the model is
approximated as the way raised by Aono et al. [2016]. We will show the training data can completely
be inferred by an honest-but-curious participant.
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2 Related Work
Aono et al. [2017] has shown part of the training data is leaked in collaborative learning in the
situation that one batch only contains a single data. Melis et al. [2018] proved that the features of the
training data which are unrelated with the model target leak through the update procedure. Zhu et al.
[2019] use an optimization method to infer the whole training data based on the gradient leaked
from the update procedure. However this optimization method does not apply to the approximated
logistic regression model since gradients computed based on different batches could be same. In
addition, none of these works consider the case where the gradient is computed based on multiple
batches.
3 Leakage Analysis
3.1 Preliminary
Consider the two-party case of federated learning, where two parties (Alice and Bob) share the same
logistic regression model. The parameters of the federated model is θ and the feature num of inputs
is d. Consider the case where all elements of the input data are either 0 or 1 which has practial
application in domains like gene analysis (e.g. Uhlerop et al. [2013]) and risk analysis.
The way of training is the same as the horizontal case in Yang et al. [2019]: In each iteration, (1)
Alice (Bob) computes local training gradients∆An (∆
B
n ) by Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) and
sends∆An (∆
B
n ) to the server. (2) The server uses secure aggregation raised by Aono et al. [2017] to
aggregate∆θn =
1
2 (∆
A
n +∆
B
n ) (3) The server sends the aggregated gradient∆n back to Alice and
Bob. (4) Alice (Bob) updates his local model by θn+1 = θn −∆θn.
The loss function of this model is l = log2− 12 (θ
Tx)+ 18 (θ
Tx)2 the same as the approximated way
of Aono et al. [2016] for the secure aggregation in the third step of training. The gradient of the loss
function in the matrix form is∇ = 14X
TXθ − 12X
TY .
Notice that ∆Bn = 2∆θn −∆
A
n . Suppose Alice is an honest-but-curious participant and thus∆
B
n is
leaked to Alice. We assume Bob uses the same data for all iterations and Alice can obtain as many
pairs (∆Bn , θn−1) as possible. There are two common method to compute the training gradients
in the first step of training: synchronized and asynchronized. In the following sections we will
ommit the superscript B and the subscript n and discuss what Alice can infer from the obtained set
S = {(∆, θ)} seperately with both methods.
3.2 Synchronized
We first consider the synchronized case, where Bob calculates gradients based on his own data in
current batch. Without loss of generality we assume Bob only has one batch of dataX . Let α denote
XT and β denoteXTY and thus∆ = λ∇ = λ(14αθ −
1
2β). Notice that ∆(i) = λ(
1
4α(i)θ −
1
2β(i))
(the subscript (i) denote the ith row of a matrix) is a linear equation. Hence α(i) and β(i) can be
solved out if ‖S‖ ≥ d. Therefore α = XTX and β = XTY are leaked. If the batchX containsm
samples, Alice can obtain:
αij =
m∑
k=1
xkixkj i, j = 1, 2, . . . , d (1)
where X = {xki}k=1,2,··· ,m,i=1,2,··· ,d is Bob’s private data. Futhermore, Alice can change the
knotty quadratic equation set to a linear programming and solve outX :
According to Equation.(1), αii =
∑m
k=1 x
2
ki. Since xki ∈ {0, 1}, xki = x
2
ki. Thus we have
αii =
∑m
k=1 xki. For αij , i 6= j, let δijk denote xkixkj , we have αij =
∑m
k=1 δijk . Given that if
and only if xki = xkj = 1, δijk = 1, otherwise δijk = 0, we can rewrite this relation to a if-then
constraint: if δijk = 1 then xki + xkj = 2 ≥ 2 and if δijk = 0 then xki + xkj ≤ 1.
Consider the first constraint: if δijk = 1 then xki + xkj ≥ 2. The inequality −xki − xkj + 2 ≤
2(1 − δijk) is equivalent to the constriant (When δijk = 1, the inequality is the original constraint.
When δijk = 0, the inequality−xki−xkj+2 ≤ 2 always holds). Hence xki+xkj ≥ 2δijk . Similarly
we can get the equivalent linear constraint form of the second constraint: xki + xkj − 1 ≤ δijk .
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Hence Alice can change Equation.(1) to the following linear constraints:
m∑
k=1
xki = αii, i = 1, 2, · · · , d
m∑
k=1
δijk = αij , i, j = 1, 2, · · · , d, i 6= j
xki + xkj ≥ 2δijk, i, j = 1, 2, · · · , d, i 6= j, k = 1, 2, · · · ,m
xki + xkj − 1 ≤ δijk, i, j = 1, 2, · · · , d, i 6= j, k = 1, 2, · · · ,m
xij , δijk ∈ {0, 1}, i, j = 1, 2, · · · , d, k = 1, 2, · · · ,m
This linear programming problem can be easily solved by revised simplex method or inner point
method as shown in Table.1. Futhermore, even if the data has non-binary features, this method can
separate them from binary features and reveal the latter.
3.3 Asynchronized
In this section we will discuss the leakage in asychronized case, where Bob uses serveral batches to
calculate the gradients. For each batchXi, Bob calculates its gradients∇i based on the current local
model θi and then updates the local model by θi+1 = θi−λ∇i. After all batches have been used Bob
pushes the difference between the current local model and the original global model∆ = θ1− θn+1
to the server. We first give the mathematical form of∆.
Theorem 1. Suppose Bob uses n batches in asychronized cases. Let Xi denote the ith batch, Yi
denote the corresponding labels, αi denote X
T
i Xi and βi denote X
T
i Yi. Therefore ∀(∆, θ) ∈
S,∆ =
[
I −
∏n
i=1(I −
λ
4αi)
]
θ − λ2
(∑n−1
i=1
[∏n
j=i+1(I −
λ
4αj)
]
βi + βn
)
2 (λ is the learning
rate).
Proof. Since for eack batch Xi, its gradient is computed as ∇i =
1
4αiθi −
1
2βi, the theorem is true
when n = 1. Now we assume that the theorem is true for any n ≤ k and any n batches of data and
consider the case n = k + 1.
Notice that ∆ = θ1 − θn+1 = λ
∑n
i=1∇i. Let ∆k denote λ
∑k
i=1∇i and thus ∆k+1 = ∆k +
λ∇k+1.
Since∇k+1 =
1
4αk+1θk+1 −
1
2βk+1 =
1
4αk+1(θ −∆k)−
1
2βk+1, we can obtain that
∆k+1 =
λ
4
αk+1θ + (I −
λ
4
αk+1)∆k −
λ
2
βk+1
=
λ
4
αk+1θ +
[
I −
λ
4
αk+1 −
k+1∏
i=1
(I −
λ
4
αi)
]
θ
−
λ
2
(
k−1∑
i=1

 k+1∏
j=i+1
(I −
λ
4
αj)

βi + (I − λ
4
αk+1)βk + βk+1
)
=
[
I −
k+1∏
i=1
(I −
λ
4
αi)
]
θ −
λ
2
(
k∑
i=1

 k+1∏
j=i+1
(I −
λ
4
αj)

 βi + βk+1
)
Hence the theorem is true for all n ≥ 1.
By Theorem.1, γ = I−
∏k+1
i=1 (I−
λ
4αi) and η =
(∑n−1
i=1
[∏n
j=i+1(I −
λ
4αj)
]
βi+βn
)
is leaked,
as the same way of the leakage of α in Section.3.2.
2
∏
denotes the continuous multiplication of matrices, i.e.
∏
k
i=1
Mi =MkMk−1 · · ·M1
3
mtime (s) d
5 10 15 20
3 0.805 0.795 0.866 0.928
5 0.812 0.87 1.032 1.517
8 0.83 7.231 3.751 4.43
9 * 17.659 74.469 89.852
11 * 39.295 665.628 1634.821
Table 1: m represents the batch size, d represents the feature num and * represents there are multiple
batches that match the same gradient. The linear programming is solved by pulp library written
in python with an intel i5-8500 CPU (3.00GHz) and the batch is sorted in alphabetical order to
eliminate the impact of the sequence of the data in a batch.
Theorem 2. The solution of γ = I −
∏n
i=1(I −
λ
4αi) is infinite under the constraint that ∀i =
1, 2, . . . , n, αi is symmetrical
3.
Proof. When treating the equation as an equation set, we have
d(d+1)
2 variables to determine αi
due to its symmetry. Therefore we have n × d(d+1)2 variables with d
2 equations. When n ≥ 2,
n× d(d+1)2 ≥ d(d+ 1) > d
2. Thus the original equation has myriad solutions.
According to Theorem.2, γ leads to myriad possibilities of the batches matching the obtained ∆.
Notice the equation set η contains n ∗ d variables with d equations even when {αi}i=1,2,...,n is
known, which means η cannot help to reduce the possibilities. In this circumstance, it is unclear
what further information beyond γ and η about the target’s data could be inferred. It is interesting
for future work to formally justify the leakage when infinite solutions are found, e.g., how much
additional information is sufficient to reduce the solution space to a few plausible ones or even a
single one.
3.4 Multi-party
In the synchronized case where there are k (k ≥ 3) parties in the federated learning, the global model
is updated as θn =
1
k
∑k
i=1 θ
(i)
n . Thus −k∆θn =
∑k
i=1∆
(i)
n = λ
∑k
i=1(
1
4α
(i)θn−1 −
1
2β
(i)) =
λ
[
1
4 (
∑k
i=1 α
(i))θn−1 −
1
2
∑k
i=1 β
(i)
]
(the superscript (i) is used to denote the ith party).
Notice P =
(X1
...
Xk
)
is one solution of the equation
∑k
i=1 α
(i) = PTP . Therefore increasing the
number of the parties in synchronized case is equivalent to increasing the batch size. An honest-but-
curious party can infer all other participants’ data only not knowing their belongings.
However for the asychronized case,
∑k
i=1 γ
(i) = kI−
∑k
i=1
∏n
j=1(I−
λ
4α
(i)
j ) = I−
∏n
j=1(I−
λ
4Pj)
has no simple solution for {Pj}j=1,2,··· ,n. Hence the increase of party num in asychronized case is
unequal to the increase of batch size. We do not further analyze how to simplify the multi-party case
to the two-party case since Alice can only infer some constraints in the two-party case for now.
4 Defense
4.1 Batch size
In Section 3.2 we use a linear programmingmethod to obtain the whole batch data from the gradient
computed, whereas this linear programmingmethod has d+d2−d+2nd(d−1) = (2n+1)d2−2nd
constraints. As shown in Table 1, the more constraints the linear programming have, the longer time
it takes to solve. Table.1 also shows with the increase of m come multiple batches corresponding
the same gradient even under the constriant that all elements are binary.
3The constraint is because αi = X
T
i Xi
4
4.2 Batch gradient
As discussed in Section 3.3, Alice cannot solve out Bob’s data just based on the gradients. Thus
avoiding leaking the batch gradient would be a effective method. The simplest way is to avoid using
synchronized method to compute the training gradients. Another method is to obscure the orginal
gradient. For instance, Bob may shuffle the sequence of his data to obfuscate Alice or pushes the
gradient selectively as proposed by Shokri and Shmatikov [2015].
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss the leakage in federated learning of approximated logistic regression model.
We first showed how an honest-but-curious participant can easily infer the whole training data of
other participants in synchronized case. We then quantified of the leakage in asychronized case and
illustrated an honest-but-curious can infer nothing other than some certain constraints of the other
participants’ training data. We also analyzed how the hyperparameters of the learning, batch size
and participant, affect the leakage and further proposed several plausible defenses.
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